China's New Silk Road, officially known as the Belt and Road Initiative (Belt and Road Initiative, BRI), is an international investment, infrastructure, and connectivity initiative launched by Beijing in 2013. Although the BRI's public presence may seem to have diminished in global discourse, China has succeeded in transforming many member countries with profound consequences.

Although the New Silk Road was conceived to connect Eurasia with China, Beijing has expanded its conception of the initiative and Africa has turned out to be a great opportunity for Chinese capital. Firstly, the land route seeks to connect Europe and other Asian countries mainly through Central Asia, emulating the historic Silk Road. On the other hand, the maritime route aims to connect ports in Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, East Africa, and Europe. Furthermore, China is looking towards Latin America as a potential new region for the BRI.¹ Ethiopia is one of these cases, having signed the Memorandum of Understanding to integrate into the BRI in 2018,² being considered a BRI model in Africa³, although – contrary to a widespread view – Ethiopia is not rich in natural resources⁴.

On a macro level, China's presence in Ethiopia is much greater than that of Western countries, who understand the African country as a recipient of humanitarian and development aid. In contrast, China is perceived to understand Ethiopia as a true trading, investment, and political partner. Ethiopia's integration into the BRI was the culmination of this relationship, but before this step, as well as after, China's economic presence has gone and continues to go far beyond projects strictly linked to the BRI.

From 2000 to 2019, total Chinese loans to Ethiopia amounted to $13.719 billion.⁵, accounting for 17% of Ethiopia's external debt. In Ethiopia, Chinese investment is primarily focused on transportation infrastructure and industrialization for manufacturing.

Regarding the transportation sector, the most relevant project was the co-financing and construction of the railway line between the capital, Addis Ababa, and Djibouti, Ethiopia's main access to the sea. This mega-project, inaugurated in 2018, connected the country, with over 130 million landlocked inhabitants and their consequent import needs, with the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, which would become part of the BRI. Furthermore, its geopolitical nature is noteworthy, given that Djibouti hosts China's only overseas military base.⁶

Through the Export-Import Bank of China, 85% of the cost of the Addis Ababa tram was also financed,⁷ as part of the city's modernization. However, local authorities were later unable to bear the maintenance costs for the trains and tracks, which has reduced their capabilities, highlighting the lack of sustainability of many Chinese investments.

Furthermore, Chinese companies have carried out numerous road constructions, with the near omnipresence of CCCC in both the capital and rural areas, the China Communications Construction Company, majority state-owned.⁸The clearest example is the first highway built in the country, between Addis Ababa and the nerve center of Adama, in the Oromia region, carried out by CCCC.

In the manufacturing sector, Chinese capital has made a strong commitment to building large industrial parks in Addis Ababa as well as in regional capitals and cities, such as Hawassa in the south or Dukem in the center.⁹ These industrial parks have attracted hundreds of factories, creating thousands of jobs for Ethiopians, primarily in manufacturing.

In addition to being the continent's second most populous country, Ethiopia is its political capital, hosting the headquarters of the African Union (AU) and numerous United Nations agencies. This symbolic weight led China to finance and build the headquarters of the AU and the Africa CDC (Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention). Even, The World reported that during an African summit, hidden microphones were detected in the buildings and a digital data transfer from the AU headquarters to China occurred.¹⁰

It should be noted that the New Silk Road in Africa—and Ethiopia is no exception—is linked to the Chinese doctrine of developmental peace, peace through development coordinated by a strong central government.¹¹ In other words, in the image and likeness of China itself. This doctrine differentiates it from the liberal peace ideal of Western democracies, as it is based on the state and economic development, setting aside aspects of democratic governance, social issues, and human rights.¹²

This entire economic presence has a political translation: China is a better alternative for the Ethiopian government and elites than traditional Western partners, as its economic collaboration is presented as a relationship between equals and does not come with democratizing or human rights conditions. This understanding is based on the rhetoric of non-interference in internal affairs that anchors Chinese foreign policy.¹³ In turn, this has benefited the Ethiopian federal government during the civil war with the TPLF.Tigray People's Liberation Front), an armed secessionist group from the north, by opposing international and US sanctions against Addis Ababa for its excesses. In 2017, China and Ethiopia elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership.¹⁴ In addition, military cooperation between the two countries includes the provision of artillery, armored and transport vehicles, and military training for the Ethiopian armed forces.¹⁵

Although Ethiopia has grown in macroeconomic terms and trade between the two countries has deepened, the BRI and other Chinese investments bring a series of problems for the lives of Ethiopian citizens.

Construction and industrialization with Chinese characteristics have led to low labor rights standards, including a lack of safety measures for workers, long working hours, and low wages. While in certain rural areas, former farmers converted into industrial workers have experienced a slight wage increase, the conversion of agricultural land and the lack of social justice in a broader sense tarnish these results.¹⁶

This industrialization on agricultural land is in addition to aggressive road and infrastructure construction projects in natural areas, which have a significant ecological impact.¹⁷ However, the ban on importing combustion engine vehicles imposed by the Ethiopian government has multiplied sales of Chinese electric cars,¹⁸ even though it is a country that, paradoxically, suffers from recurrent power outages.

Another major problem with Chinese investments is their lack of long-term sustainability. In the infrastructure sector, these are usually isolated projects with high visibility and large initial investments. Planning does not adequately consider sustainability once maintenance is no longer covered by Chinese capital and becomes the responsibility of Ethiopia, whose institutions have significant budgetary and capacity deficiencies. For example, the Addis Ababa light rail was envisioned as the start of a revolution in urban transport, but the lack of technical capacity, funding, and institutional commitment to ensure its viability has led to maintenance problems and a number of operational trams and passengers far below projections.¹⁹

Finally, it should be noted that the recurring instability and insecurity in Ethiopia are likely the most concerning disadvantage for China, a country that values stability above all else.²⁰ For the moment, your investments have been cautious and have been mostly located away from conflict zones; otherwise, Chinese personnel have been evacuated in a very preventive manner in the face of indications of insecurity.

The New Silk Road and other Chinese projects in Ethiopia are having a considerable impact on the African country's economy, politics, and society. Ethiopia is among the African countries with the greatest presence of the BRI, and it is seen by Beijing as a model for this cooperation.

Although these investments present multiple problems as indicated, they fundamentally affect the lower classes of Ethiopia – the vast majority. With a system of government experiencing constant regression in pluralism, China's mode of engagement – large-scale, highly visible investment without interference in internal political affairs or high labor standards – proves particularly convenient for Ethiopian political and economic elites.

Although China is the most attractive partner, other players are playing a prominent role in the Ethiopian economy and trade, such as Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Products and investments from the Arabian Peninsula have a significant presence in Ethiopia, at the heart of the Horn of Africa, a region that is strategically important to the Gulf monarchies, separated only by the Red Sea. On the other hand, the European Union, despite being one of the major development financiers in Ethiopia, has not, for the moment, managed to translate this advantage into public visibility or political influence.

With this in mind, the diplomatic withdrawal from Africa by the United States, stemming from a new isolationism, as well as the suspension of USAID aid, represent a key strategic opportunity for China to deepen its de facto asymmetric relationship with Ethiopia. While the humanitarian and development sector in the country suffers the ravages of a US policy perceived as erratic, Beijing presents itself as the reliable partner that has been supporting the Ethiopian government and economy for over two decades.