

The Strategies of Hawks and Doves.

A Look at the Geopolitical-Historical Dynamics of Militarism and War

Abstract:

Why is it so complex to define war, to identify its patterns, and to establish a universal law that could serve as a basis for its study? Would such law be useful for achieving a more efficient reading of the international relations and geopolitical scenario?

This report seeks to address those questions and, as a consequential step, a solution to the methodological problems they imply. Furthermore, it aims to test this solution by offering a pragmatic standpoint, thereby providing a tool for understanding contemporary geopolitical dynamics between different actors.

The report does not attempt to simplify a concept as complex as war and its surrounding elements. Rather, it intends to point out different approach misunderstandings when studying such a phenomenon, and to serve as a guide for recognising some of the common patterns in political reality, from the conception and deflagration of war to its long-lasting consequences.

Therefore, it is expected that, through the findings of this research, a platform will be created that facilitates the interpretation of the current geopolitical situation, contributing to a more unified framework for the study of war.

Introduction

War, conflict, disagreement, the volatile passing of time, ideas, human communities and interests. Even though today's scholars have at their disposal a whole compendium of works, it has not yet been possible to find the real and definitive hypothesis as to why human beings reach such disagreement to end the lives of their equals.

This confusion and fascination with the study of violence and conflict has allowed the formulation of hundreds of theories and, more importantly, the beginning of a quest to understand on the one hand, the 'guilty' element of being the engine that moves history and, on the other hand, the real reason for the phenomenology of war. The intention, therefore, of this

research paper is to compile and analyse the different academic explanations given to the explosion of interstate violence and to provide a new proposal, achieving two main objectives:

- To show a cause-consequence explanatory hypothesis founded on the dissection of the literature on the subject written prior to this project.
- To demonstrate the effectiveness of this hypothesis in analyzing the international geopolitical panorama by examining significant or potentially relevant examples within its theoretical framework.

Once these objectives have been completed, it is to be expected that the different strategies of states when facing international relations can be predicted in order to know whether these states will adopt what have been baptized as the opposing roles of a dove (diplomatic/passive/defensive) or of a hawk (aggressive/assertive/bellicose). It will be these characteristics that, despite their dichotomy, will provide a glimpse of the probable future interactions and dynamics of the international scenario.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

There are several elements that have already been written about in a great deal of literature related to war and the ways of waging war. However, the first mention that should be made is to the analogy of personifying the different states in a classification of hawks and doves. Although the metaphor is not original, as it was first used in an article in the geopolitical journal *Foreign Policy*, co-authored by Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, its use has come to refer to politicians, policymakers, or heads of state.¹ This research endows the characteristics provided by this metaphor to the states themselves, which bring with them a tradition and geopolitical history that leads them to act in a certain way regardless of the sign of their government or the personality governing them.

In this regard, most of the discourses dedicated to this subject end up relegating themselves to being a compilation of the different schools of thought on international relations which, rather than providing explanations of war, propose different frictions between ways of seeing the world

¹ Kahneman, D., & Renshon, J. (2007). Why Hawks Win. *Foreign Policy*, 158, 34-38.

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/25462124>

that end up conflagrating into conflicts. An example of this is the ideas proposed by the academic Jack S. Levy, who in several articles tries to expose these characteristics described here, showing simplified conjectures of the standpoint of the aforementioned schools of thought that fails to give a satisfactory explanation to everything related to the subject.

As Levi himself points out in one of these essays:

“It is not easy to characterize the state of the art with respect to the study of interstate war and peace, in part because of the many dimensions by which we might evaluate the extent of cumulation of knowledge. Some pessimists will emphasize the absence of consensus about what the causes of war are, what theoretical and methodological approaches are most useful for identifying and validating those causes, what criteria are appropriate for evaluating competing theories, and whether it is possible to generalize about anything as complex and context dependent as war”^{2 3}

Another obstacle to overcome for the person interested in the study of war may come from something even more primordial than pattern recognition, and that stumbling block ends up being the very definition of "war". As the scholar Beatrice Hauser comments in one of her writings:

“Human language never captures reality in its entirety. It reduces reality to fit the particular organizing principles of a particular language and its vocabulary, and of prevailing interpretational patterns. (...) many categorizations of war may have been useful in a particular context but have in different contexts been unhelpful. (...) a war's positioning may change as the war evolves”⁴.

This same author exposes the complications of consensus when it comes to categorizing war by showing that there are various points of view from which to define it, according to Heuser these

² Levy, J. S. (2013). *Handbook of international relations*, p.596 (W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse-Kappen, & B. A. Simmons, Eds.; 2nd ed). Sage.

³ Levy, J. S. (1988). Domestic Politics and War. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 653.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/204819>

⁴ Heuser, B. (2022). *War: A genealogy of western ideas and practices* (First edition) pp. 12, 125, 126. Oxford University Press.

would be: ethical, political, and legal. However, she concludes that, for practical reasons, the definition of war that interests the social scholar is:

“The practice of organized violence between two groups, but to include configurations where one side uses violence against another large but unarmed group, making ideologically founded claims that the latter poses a vital threat to their own group. Ideological drivers or political aims should be present, even if economic ones are as well. (...) We shall include any conflicts that were seen as war (i.e. if a contemporary equivalent term for war was used) by contemporaries. We shall exclude spontaneous, non-organized uprisings—an important feature of war is that it is planned (at least on one side) in cold blood.”⁵

Although fragments and ideas of the arguments presented here by different authors will be used -as they are not disposable by any means-, the purpose of this preliminary display of ideas is to show that the study of war as a category within the social sciences -and geopolitics par excellence-, is at a moment in which there is no real consensus on how to approach its study .

About the origins of militarism and the material importance of statecraft

In order to give a proper analysis, it is necessary to deal with the definition of war. A fundamental premise for comprehending war as a phenomenon is the following: war requires the prior existence of the state as a superstructural entity. Of course, due to the big amount of definitions for the concept of war, there will be scholars who are against such a statement, however, this feature is given for practical reasons in order to have a starting point. Nevertheless, an explanation must be given.

As Heuser already hinted in the previous section, conflicts that arise spontaneously and without any kind of prior management should not be understood as having the characteristics of war. War, as a category, as a concept, is something planned by at least one of the two parties in conflict. What Heuser does not explicitly state -although she does it implicitly- is that the only way to develop and maintain over time such an eventuality is achieved with the existence of a superstructure with the accumulative, managerial and organized capacity of the state as an institution. Thus, the first step in defining war must be to trace the definition and origins of the

⁵ *Ibid.*

state, from which to construct a narrative of the historical tradition of war in order to identify its patterns and modes that allow us to weave a method of categorizing war.

In this context, the definition of the state does not require reinvention. The sociologist and economist Max Weber has already provided a definition that is perfectly appropriate for the subject at hand. It is the case because the author takes as a basis the concept of 'Domination' and then jumps to the concept of 'state' itself. Domination is understood as the "probability that an order with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of people (...) it does not necessarily imply the existence of an administrative organ or even the existence of an organization (...) it is, however, uncommon to find it (domination) unlinked to at least one of them".⁶ From this point on, the state is defined as "any human community that claims for itself (successfully) the monopoly of violence over a given territory".⁷ It would be convenient to add to this definition that, consequently, this monopoly of violence also extends to the exploitation and usufruct of resources and over the rest of the human beings that inhabit that territory.

Thus, it is essential to reach a preliminary conclusion on the origin of war. It has its germ in the questioning of the legitimacy of this monopoly of violence by both internal and external actors and aims, from its very planning, to take away, diminish or irremediably change this exercise of violence by the first group to have this capacity. "This is hardly unexpected, given that it represents an observable and empirically verifiable pattern, when doing a review of the history of warfare. In a preview of the following section, some practical examples are given to further cement the importance of the state in understanding the emergence of warfare.

The first wars on European soil occurred in today's Spain and Germany, between the years 3380-3000 and 2000-1200 B.C., respectively. The importance of mentioning these wars falls in the fact that both investigations demonstrate the reason they are considered the first "wars" and not any other conflict before or after them.

In the case of the German archaeological site, the researchers emphasize that "the finds in the Tollense Valley testify to a large violent conflict of supra-regional scale. This conflict should be interpreted in the framework of the social and economic development that characterized Central

⁶ Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and society; an outline of interpretive sociology*, pp.53-54. Bedminster Press.

⁷ Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and society; an outline of interpretive sociology*, p. 54. Bedminster Press.

Europe in the thirteenth century cal BC.”⁸ Archaeological evidence of the organizational requirements of that battle indicates the indispensability of the state superstructure. Without it, neither the scale of the battle, the characteristics of the subsequent funerary rites, nor the necessary administration and material production of such a large conflict can be adequately understood.

The reasons for the deflagration are somewhat hidden, however, for the historical height in which it is framed not many options remain to be proposed, and, in fact, researchers at the University of Salamanca who studied the second conflict mentioned give an explanation that could well apply equally to the previous battle.

“Diversification in funerary treatment may also be seen as the culmination of internal unrest as a means to negotiate social conflict and community boundaries (...) The possible arrival of people to the region during this period, suggested by some authors based on the occupation of foothill areas, the emergence of burial in caves and rockshelters, and the appearance of new types of megalithic graves and ritual changes, may have provided a possible trigger (...) tentatively suggest endogenous growth and other internal factors as the most plausible causes behind those novelties and, potentially, the roots of conflict”⁹

In addition to this, they reaffirm the aforementioned need for an organization corresponding only to such a complex structure as the state even if it was in its most primitive phases as expected at the time.

“By contrast, larger-scale organized and sanctioned lethal violence between sociopolitical groups (i.e., warfare), seems to be associated with certain socio-economic conditions that generally accompanied the shift to a farming economy, such as higher population densities and greater degrees of sedentism , in parallel to the increasing importance of

⁸ Uhlig, T., Krüger, J., Lidke, G., Jantzen, D., Lorenz, S., Ialongo, N., & Terberger, T. (2019). Lost in combat? A scrap metal find from the Bronze Age battlefield site at Tollense, p. 1227. *Antiquity*, 93(371), 1211-1230. <https://doi.org/10.15184/aqy.2019.137>

⁹ Fernández-Crespo, T., Ordoño, J., Etxeberria, F., Herrasti, L., Armendariz, Á., Vegas, J. I., & Schulting, R. J. (2023), p.13. Large-scale violence in Late Neolithic Western Europe based on expanded skeletal evidence from San Juan ante Portam Latinam. *Scientific Reports*, 13(1), 17103. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-43026-9>

resource ownership and property that led to the concentration of resources and power”

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“Evidence of arrowhead injuries and other skeletal signs of violence (e.g., cranial trauma, parry fractures) in other coeval sites of the region, supports an image of standing and organized violence between rival communities. This, together with skeletal and isotopic evidence compatible with biological stress and malnourishment and with fixed mobility in the region, suggests wider social impacts to an extent that has not previously been seen for the European Neolithic record.”¹¹

Therefore, the analysis in this section has pursued a double objective. On the one hand, showing that the concept of is not tied to a strict historical periodicity, as long as it is possible to trace human communities -already constituted as states under the definition provided- exercising dominion over their population with the aim of engaging in conflict for the monopoly of violence over another community’s territory, thereby allowing signs of war even in the origins of the Neolithic state.

On the other hand, to demonstrate the indispensable role of the state as a structural prerequisite, for without it war cannot be conceived, even in its most elementary conditions. The state is what gives the material capacity necessary for the initiation and persistence of conflict, and the motives that drive human communities to confront each other over territory, population, and resources. In short, war cannot be conceived without the material reality of the state.

Considerations on non-state actors

At this stage, it becomes necessary to consider the apparent absoluteness of the symbiotic relationship between war and state, wondering whether actors not belonging to the state, or not acting under its authority, can be subjects of war as such. The short answer is yes there are a multiplicity of actors who can be participants in a war and even have their own objectives within it, in the same way that there are actors who carry out violent actions against the state that can be

¹⁰ Fernández-Crespo, T., Ordoño, J., Etxeberria, F., Herrasti, L., Armendariz, Á., Vegas, J. I., & Schulting, R. J. (2023), p.1. Large-scale violence in Late Neolithic Western Europe based on expanded skeletal evidence from San Juan ante Portam Latinam. *Scientific Reports*, 13(1), 17103. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-023-43026-9>

¹¹ *Ibid.*

qualified as an act of war -and be called a conflict as such- but are not formally recognised as such.

However, with this type of actors there are at least one of these two characteristics, if not both: they are not the direct initiators of the conflicts, since that power corresponds to the state and/or they emerge as such and initiate violent actions as a consequence of the actions of one or several states both within and outside the context of a real war.

There are several examples of them throughout history, such as the case of the Soviet Red Army which, above all, was cemented as a necessity for the triumph of the revolution and did not begin to take on the characteristics of a real army until it had to face the Tsarist forces in a civil war.

Following this same idea, other examples are groups that exercise political violence against the state, whether in the form of terrorist tactics or other types of violent disobedience to the monopoly of state force, such as the I.R.A., Sendero Luminoso or any other similar organization. On the other hand, there are paramilitary organizations that make use of their force for the fulfilment of the service of one state against another, such as the Wagner Group. Finally, there are the actors of territorial and legal dispute against the state in order to not only have an effective control of a territory within the state, but also to transform it, not only into an area of exercise of violence, but also into a particular market from which to generate a private profit, such as the Cartels, the mafias or any other similar organization.

In this context, four fundamental groups are identified, which will be defined and their involvement with the state and with the war will be briefly discussed:

The first one, mercenaries (and their modern derivation, the Private Military Contractors), are in short, a group or company -depending on the historical moment- that puts at the service of a state its capacity to use armed force to achieve the objectives of the contracting state in order to obtain a benefit that can come either from the fulfilment of the contract or from the agreement on the plundering of the territory on which they act on behalf of the contracting state. "Point d'argent, point de Suisse" ¹² said the French between the sixteenth and seventeenth century in

¹² Pittoresque, L. F. (2011, diciembre 17). *Point d'argent, point de Suisse. Origine, signification proverbe, expression populaire. Dictionnaire locutions*. La France pittoresque. Histoire de France, Patrimoine, Tourisme, Gastronomie. <https://www.france-pittoresque.com/spip.php?article5471>

reference to the need for capital for the hiring of Swiss military forces with which to support their European expansion campaigns. Therefore, the emergence of mercenaryism would not be possible, nor would it make sense without a state structure to support it.

A human group does not use violence for economic benefit without an entity with sufficient capacity to ensure that benefit. Its trace, therefore, can also be traced back to the emergence of the first states, "The ancient states replenished their population through wars of capture and by buying slaves on a large scale from barbarians who specialized in their trade. Moreover, there was hardly an early state that did not hire barbarian mercenaries for its defence. By selling both their barbarian comrades and their own military service to the early states, the barbarians contributed mightily to the decline of their brief golden age".¹³

The second group, Terrorist groups, have various motivations (mainly political and religious), and could be defined as a group that engages in clandestine violence because they cannot fight on equal terms against a well-organized state (with far greater resources and military capacity). The main objective of terrorism is to influence the governance of a state or even to gain territorial independence from it.¹⁴

Therefore, the real objective -although it is also the means of these groups- is the dispute over the legitimacy of the monopoly of violence. As can be seen, therefore, terrorism likely emerges as a consequence of the policies of a state, and a war against terrorism can only be considered as such when one of these groups begins to adopt the dynamics of a state by gaining control over a given territory. An example of the latter would be the Afghan Taliban whose terrorist tactics ultimately led them to form a state and enter, now, into war with the United States and its allies.

The third one, organized crime groups such as drug cartels or mafias, can become a real obstacle for the states in which they are established. As mentioned above, the motivation of these organizations is not the dispute per se of the monopoly of violence, which rather ends up being a means and consequence of their main motive: the economic exploitation by illegal means of the controlled territory. The supposed war against this type of groups is usually more of a police force than a military nature, which is only conducted when the situation of the state is so critical

¹³ Scott, J. C. (2022). *Contra el estado: Una historia de las civilizaciones del próximo oriente antiguo*, p.46 (A. de Cabo de la Vega, J. Riello, & R. de Dorado Puntch, Trans.). Editorial Trotta.

¹⁴ González Calleja, E. (2012). *El laboratorio del miedo: Una historia general del terrorismo, de los sicarios a Al Qaeda*. p.6 Crítica editorial.

that it could almost be considered a failed state.¹⁵ On very few occasions is it truly possible to speak of a war, neither between groups of the same type nor between them and the state. If this were the case, in fact, the criminal group would almost adopt the characteristics of the state as a structure, which would remove it from its status as a non-state actor.

Lastly, revolutionary movements must be understood from Heuser's argument exposed at the beginning of the essay mentioning spontaneous uprisings, which are discarded. Revolutionaries, as their main objective, do have as their goal the overthrow and occupation of state institutions and, as Lenin rightly mentioned: "The revolution is not made, it is organized"¹⁶. What then makes the struggle against them not to be considered a war, the answer to that question is simple perspective. Most armed civil uprisings in history have been taken as mere tumults or revolts to be quelled, more deserving of the category of maintenance of internal order than of a war.

Political revolution, in fact, is a relatively modern phenomenon, as Hobsbawm already exposes in his work "The Age of Revolution" when discussing the Atlantic revolutionary cycle¹⁷ and which, similarly, has only had to cope with modern post-Westphalian state configurations.

This is why understanding the struggle of a revolution and its triumph or failure in terms of war is a mistake, since, again, it could only begin to be considered as such once the revolution is completed and assumes the prerogatives of the state institutions it has just conquered, as in the example of the Russian Revolution, but it is something that can be seen even in the American Revolution for its independence and in the French Revolution with Napoleon Bonaparte declaring war on the whole of Europe.

The inequality force, some historical examples.

Once all the theoretical foundations on the origins of war and the state have been laid out, it remains to begin to consider the true vision of warmongering that this paper proposes. What, then, drives states to confront one another? Is war more likely when conquest appears easy?

¹⁵ Instituto español de estudios estratégicos (Ed.). (2011). *Panorama geopolítico de los conflictos 2011*. pp. 135-166-Ministerio de defensa.

¹⁶ Lenin, V. I. (2022) [1917]. *El Estado y la revolución* (Segunda edición, octava reimpresión: 2022). Alianza Editorial.

¹⁷ Hobsbawm, E. J. (2011) [1999]. *La era de la revolución: 1789-1848* (Primera edición en nueva presentación). Crítica.

Could peace be reinforced by making conquest more difficult? And, more broadly, what are the undelying causes of offensive action?¹⁸

One of the possible explanations may come from the proposal of PhD Jaime Alvar Ezquerra, which has a particular way of explaining the expansionist, imperialist and military movements of states against other states. He comments¹⁹ that the fundamental force of inertia that led a state towards warmongering was to try to fulfil by all means the following equation that he used as a metaphorical model: "political territory=economic territory".²⁰

The model is grounded on the Marxist understanding of states as inherently imperialist. In this view, the expansionist drive is inevitable and that, therefore, it is only a matter of time before a state, by nature, sees its opportunity to initiate offensive actions against other states, be they warlike or of any other kind. Always with the objective of enforcing the aforementioned equation, this ambition to equate political territory with economic territory represents the most primary motivation for the expansion of a state, since the greater the political territory, the greater the control of an economic territory with the potential to expand in turn, towards nearby areas of economic influence. The result of this is a feedback process *ad infinitum* which, as the professor mentioned, can be summarized as unrealistic, impossible and even irresponsible for the administration of one's own state.

From this point on, the model aspires to understand the rulers of an expanding state. The conclusion can be summarized in that they should be aware of the impossibility of this growth towards infinity and how the "Empire-state" is doomed to disaster if they do not stop it in time and establish clear territorial limits for it. This is why the professor transforms it into the following expression: 'political territory $\neq$ economic territory', thus converting the model into a 'historic-mathematical' inequality. In this way, representing the impossibility of unbridled growth based on imperialist expansion, the idea is certainly not to show that a historical process such as the expansionism of states was a catastrophic error, but simply to understand that this

¹⁸ Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War, p.5. *International Security*, 22(4), 5-43.
<https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.4.5>

¹⁹ Albar Ezquerra, J. (2023). Sesión didáctica pública. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.

²⁰ Political territory is understood to be the factual territory of the state, the one corresponding to it. definition provided by this writing, while the economic territory is a more abstract concept that, apart from including the area of economic exploitation corresponding to the political territory, understands that it can also involve even cross-border territories that may (or may not, even if they are the least occasions) to a foreign state.

expansionism, on the one hand, is an implicit and essential characteristic of states and, on the other, to understand what is the almost equally natural force that forced them to this expansion.

This is not intended to show that all military history, wars and all previous study in this respect is invalidated by an attempt at a universal explanation in the form of an inequality. However, it is a proposition that exposes an essential motive for expansionism, which, in fact, can and should be accompanied by many explanatory elements about the governance, politics, regime, society and internal economy of the state in question. Inequality should not be regarded as the ultimate explanatory key to understanding the phenomenon of war but as a starting point and fuse to make sense of the rest of the elements and concepts that allow us to understand this phenomenology in many more dimensions. As the economist Dani Rodrik mentioned in his book "Economic Rules":

“For critics, economists’ reliance on models captures almost everything that is wrong with the profession: the reduction of the complexities of social life to a few simplistic relationships, the willingness to make patently untrue assumptions, the obsession with mathematical rigor over realism, the frequent jump from stylized abstraction to policy conclusions.”²¹

Once the model has been exposed, all that remains is, in this section, to show some historical examples of its application to have a different approach to the events that are analysed. An example that will serve as a prelude to the next section's argument about hawks and doves: the campaigns of Alexander the Great. Macedonia, until the arrival of Philip II, was considered a semi-barbaric state by the very civilized Greeks, its existence was limited to its traditional borders with Hellade to the south and Thrace to the north and its status was a minor power, more similar to of a dove.

However, the end of the Peloponnesian War -in which Thrace also participated in Athenian support- in 404 BC, weakened the Greek poleis so much that, together with Macedonian military-technological advances, Macedonian foreign policy became that of a falcon, so King Philip II began a campaign of conquest against Thrace (357-335 BC) and against the Greek

²¹ Rodrik, D. (2017). *Economics rules: Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference*, p.10. Oxford University Press.

Poleis scattered and weakened by the Hellenic peninsula (342-337 BC), both being victorious campaigns which cemented Macedonia as hegemon of the region.²²

It would precisely be the beginning of this conquering impulse and the acquisition of so much political territory that it will administer, which will give Macedonia control of the commercial colonies in Asia Minor, bordering the Persian Empire. This growing commercial influence with the Persian bordering areas led Macedonia, already impregnated by the expansive forces of inequality, to design the invasion of the Persian Empire, a task that would be conducted by Alexander the Great.

This explanation, although it does not claim to be universally true, confers a much more plausible historiographic veracity than interpreting the Macedonian expansion as a crusade for the glory of Greece and its culture led by the great man who would be King Alexander. The rest of the history is widely known, Alexander begins his endless campaign that leads him to even enter India but, as the inequality already demonstrates, the momentum would end up waning after Alexander's death, leading to the division of the Empire between the Deacons and companions of Alexander, demonstrating the impossibility of equating a territory of economic influence in continuous expansion due to the parallel expansion without limits in the field of political control.

The example of Rome is even more pronounced, since the time of the Monarchy, Rome's imperialist desire was feared by its neighbouring states and its economic model, based on the distribution of conquered lands and the enslavement of populations for their exploitation, was so effective that it even destroyed the same subsequent republican configuration of the state, progressively adapting to the Empire model that was implemented until its end. If the case of Macedonia could still be supported by other elements apart from imperialism as such, that of Rome seemed almost even one-dimensional since its entire economy was based on its expansion.

Thus, it was that the Empire, already established after the rise of Augustus and his successors to power, practically reached the limits of said expansion that was seen as impossible to increase with the Persians in the east, German tribes in the north and a very vast extension of desert towards southern Africa. With the beginning of an almost self-imposed Pax Romana due to the need to alleviate the war weariness that lasted well into the third century, Roman foreign policy

²² Barceló, P. (2001). *Breve historia de Grecia y Roma*, pp. 106-114. Alianza Editorial.

and economy were not strengthened enough to reverse the change in attitude from hawk to dove, which It served for the beginning of its imperialist decline until its disappearance as an institution in the 5th century. In this way, the rule of inequality is fulfilled again.

A final example that serves the issue can be found in the modern and contemporary age²³, the case of the British Empire. Probably the greatest exponent of all the above, as it became the most territorially extensive Empire in history that, however, also had to give up its efforts to achieve a balance between political and economic territory. Almost like a reproduction of the aforementioned Pax Romana, or of the omitted and also related Pax Hispánica that preceded it in the 18th century, the Pax Britannica finds its genesis precisely in the exacerbated expansionism of the late 18th and 19th centuries, which had to subside after the end of the First and Second World Wars.

Its imperialist expansion was characteristic, organizing the territory into areas of resource and raw material extraction (most of the African continent), areas of settlement (Canada, Australia, India) and strategic areas, support points for imperial trade. However, once again, the forces of historical inequality acted again and ended up slowly blurring the empire to make way for others.

Thousands of examples can be given when making a historical overview of the world and, with the pertinent analysis, each of them could fit into the model formulated here, to mention a few quickly and in no specific order: Nazi Germany, The Empire of the Hispanic Monarchy, The Soviet Union, The Carolingian Empire, The Aztec Empire, Carthage, Dynastic China, The French Republics, Belgium, Portugal, Japan... and a long etc. This section showed the viability of recognizing the patterns of action of states at a superficial historiographic level, which serves as a platform for the last section of the writing.

Application of the force to current geopolitical scenario: hawks and doves

Once the viability of the model for historiographic understanding has been demonstrated, another type of test is now proposed: the identification of patterns in decision-making about security and defence in current states. If this separate section is necessary and has not been taken as a sub-section of the previous one, it is for two fundamental reasons:

²³ It does not mean that during the Middle Ages these expansionist dynamics did not exist and, therefore, friction between hawks and doves, only for reasons of practicality and clarity of exposition (already that the historical period attracts other complexities) no relevant case has been mentioned.

- Due to the academic debate of considering relatively recent events (half a century until now) as history of recent time or if, on the contrary, the analysis of these events is the domain of political science due to their direct influence on the current world, which could generate alterations in the model.
- For the idealistic consideration that, precisely after the end of the Second World War, and more notably, after the end of the Cold War, the way in which states face the international scene is no longer so bellicose or tinged with imperialism.

Taking these two biases into account, then, both the inequality model and the classification between hawks and doves must be tested to simply categorize the world of current International Relations. Therefore, three relevant cases will be taken with which to apply everything stated above and see if, really, an analysis of the geopolitics of a state can be initiated taking the model and classification as a basis.

However, before all that, the categories of hawk and dove must be outlined to be able to classify the examples that will follow through the strategies they employ.

- War: as a strategy, it is employed to increase the power, natural resources, strategic zones, and population of the state as it has been already said.
- Blackmail: the act of threatening to use military force or economy, it is based on coercion and intimidation. It works against minor states without a great-power, ally/credible alliance or with nuclear capability (pigeons).²⁴
- Bait and Bleed is based on getting two rivals in a protracted confrontation (diplomatic, economic, military...). The baiter remains on the sideline waiting for both to be weakened.²⁵

²⁴ Slakaityte, V., & Surwillo, I. (2024, enero 9). Energy as a weapon—Decoding blackmail tactics in Europe | DIIS. <https://www.diis.dk/en/research/energy-as-a-weapon-decoding-blackmail-tactics-in-europe>

²⁵ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of Great Power politics* (1. ed). p.153. Norton.

- Bloodletting (Bait and Bleed variant): turn one's rival confrontation into a long costly one diminishing its strength.
- "External Balancing": create a defensive alliance to contain the threat against your state.²⁶
- "Internal Balancing": by mobilizing own state's additional resources (increasing defence spending, implementing conscription, favouring the economy, demography ...) you get prepared for any confrontation.²⁷
- "Off-Shore Balancing": projecting power over distant areas of the world using External Balancing approach.²⁸
- Buck-Passing: delegate to another state the burden of deterring/fighting the potential aggressor. The "buck-passer" remains on the sidelines, maintaining itself untouched. It is considered the main alternative to balancing.²⁹
- Bandwagoning: employed by minor states facing threatening big powers, it is defined by a state joining a more powerful and threatening power to counter the power of the threat.³⁰
- Appeasement: a threatened state makes concessions to an aggressor to minify its aggressive behaviour hoping to reach a stable status quo.

²⁶ Layne, C. (1997). From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy. *International Security*, 22(1), 86-124. <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.22.1.86>

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of Great Power politics* (1. ed). Norton.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of Great Power politics* (1. ed). p.157. Norton.

³⁰ Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of Great Power politics* (1. ed). p.162. Norton.

In this way, if all these strategies were to be classified according to the characteristics of both types of state, the categorization would be as follows:

HAWK STATE	PIGEON STATE
- War - Blackmail - Bait and Bleed (depending on the real and material situation of the state who makes use of it). - Bloodletting (depending on the real and material situation of the state who makes use of it). - External Balancing. - Internal Balancing. - Offshore Balancing. - Buck-Passing.	- Bait and Bleed (depending on the real and material situation of the state who makes use of it) . - Bloodletting (depending on the real and material situation of the state who makes use of it). - Bandwagoning. - Appeasement.

Russia, which had already started a conflict with Ukraine in 2014 by annexing the Crimean Peninsula, is now engaged in a long-running war. What drove the warmongering mood of this state was already given even before this conflict, since only in its existence after the fall of the Soviet regime has it carried out invasions and acts of war in Chechnya, Georgia and the control of Crimea.

All of this, apart from being categorized as a hawk due to the use of strategies such as war itself, blackmailing and both internal and external balancing, makes it fit perfectly into the model of

imperialist inequality. While it is true that there are various reasons - and not all of them exclusively Russia's fault- to initiate such offensives, it is inevitable to see the imperialist component, reformulated to align with contemporary approaches to depicting war (one that involves both the international community and the domestic population) yet still rooted in imperialism.

Venezuela, which due to its rugged beginning of the 21st century, the result of the socialist wave at the end of the 20th century and US interventionism in Latin America, its foreign policy had been characterized by being relatively passive in relation to real actions that can be categorized in offensives since most of the efforts of the state's resources are directed at controlling the internal situation.

The high number of sanctions to which the state has been subjected by the international community and the little room for movement have made Venezuela's category that of a dove. However, that may be about to change due to the territorial claim over the Essequibo against the background of the location of oil reserves in the territory of the neighbouring state of Guyana. Although for the moment the actions aimed at the annexation of said political-economic territory are summarized in just claims and a non-binding referendum on the Venezuelan population, it could mean a change of tables in the Venezuelan imperialist categorization, becoming a hawk and beginning to move the gears of inequality.

The United States, part of an interesting situation since it is already an empire, needless to say that each and every one of the strategies linked to the hawks has been carried out and still maintains them in its web of extraterritorial relations. The interesting thing about his case itself is how much time there is left for the forces of historical inequality to begin to have their effect and the American Empire to enter its own Pax Americana in a much more palpable way towards unchecked decline. Only time will tell, then, what will be the moment in which the impossibility of political territory≠economic territory becomes evident for world control, apparently impassive of the United States, begins to be visible.

proved to be useful to carry out a basic preliminary analysis on the characteristics of a state and its network of relations at the international level. In the same way, they can be used to make predictions about the behaviour that they may adopt as a result of their recent actions.

Limitations and conclusions

The model is by no means perfect, nor is it suitable for all situations. Its simplicity may overlook countless nuances that challenge the viability of using this method for both political and historiographic analysis. On the other hand, its simplicity and claims to be a mere basis can end up causing the researcher who uses it to incur a bias of basing too much serious and in-depth research on an idea as simple as the one presented here. Even so both the model and the categorization are easily adaptable to different situations and studies, and can be refined to evolve as research on the topic progresses.

Its final limitation is its novelty, a lot of research and testing is necessary to reach a reliable and refuted conclusion about its viability when it comes to its usage as a tool with which to read the historical and geopolitical scenario. international that is presented. War, while significant is not everything, it has never been, even in the most violent times and years of humanity, so further research is needed to refine the points of view with which to address these scenarios using this tool.

In conclusion, the geopolitical discipline is one that, despite being important, is relatively new in the field of social sciences and, therefore, has yet to be explored and expanded with new paradigms that redefine the way of research under its methodology. That is why here, what has been presented is neither more nor less than one of those proposals that are needed for the greater development of Geopolitics as an area of knowledge and the history linked to it with which to contribute greater richness to the knowledge provided by her about the security and defence of the states.

Both hawks and doves are still a simplified allegory of the interconnected political world in which we live and the metaphorical forces of a supposed model, capable of serving as a predictive basis for reading a mechanism as complicated as that of the world order itself, should not be taken as an absurd simplification exercise but rather as a small help to take as a starting point something as incommensurable as the understanding of the current and past world.

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