In October 2023, Hamas perpetrated the most brutal attack to date on Israeli territory.¹. This fact significantly increased tension in the region, and international attention quickly focused on Iran as a key player in the escalation of the conflict. In that context of geopolitical unrest, the author faced a personal decision: to select one out of 180 countries available through a scholarship that would allow him to reside abroad for an academic year.

This situation led the author to formulate a series of fundamental questions: Does any country still not aspire to become a replica of the Western model? A place where not everyone works as a consultant, project manager, or digital marketing specialist? Where myth, tradition, and history prevail over modern comfort and social media algorithms? Within that framework, Tehran emerged as an anomaly. However, upon arrival, the surprise was different: there too, many long for ways of life typical of the Western model.

In September 2024, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted a targeted operation against Hezbollah militants, eliminating dozens of them by planting explosives in their equipment, including devices such as walkie-talkies and pagers.² Simultaneously, this information was transmitted within Iranian territory by BBC Persia, a British television channel that broadcasts its content in the Persian language. This raises a series of questions: Does the BBC have an official presence in Iran? Is its signal subject to censorship by the regime? What is the extent of this channel's penetration into daily Iranian life?

The truth is that the images and reports broadcast by BBC Persia often have an ironic or even humorous tone. A telling example of this approach was observed in their coverage of Hezbollah militants eliminated by Israel, where they aired footage from security cameras in public spaces—such as shops, supermarkets, or streets—showing the deceased shortly before they were identified as targets. This situation reveals a complex paradox: the dissemination of sensitive content in perfect Persian through a Western broadcaster, in a country with strict media controls by the regime. This ambivalent relationship between Iran and the BBC is not recent, but rather has deep roots dating back to the 1940s.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., former dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, was the first to conceptualize the term soft power, which is widely used today in international relations studies. In his own words:

“A country can achieve the results it desires in international politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—wish to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract other actors in world politics, not just force them to change through military threats or economic sanctions. This soft power—getting others to want what you want—co-opts people rather than coerces them.³

BBC Persia acts as a tool within this logic of attraction. Broadcast from London, its programming is largely produced by Iranian journalists in the diaspora, many of whom are marked by personal experiences or ideological convictions that place them in a critical position regarding the Tehran regime. This is not just a media project; it is part of a battle for the narrative and political imagination of the region.

It is necessary to remember that the 1979 Islamic Revolution not only represented a regime change, but also the collapse of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's attempt to impose a process of Westernization and secularization from above.⁴ This attempt at identity redefinition – substituting Islam as the central element with pre-Islamic national mythology – was perceived by broad sectors of society as a form of alienation and cultural betrayal.

Today, it is estimated that between two and three million Iranians reside outside the country.⁵ Who is BBC Persia therefore addressing? Undoubtedly, this diaspora, but also—and perhaps more significantly—the millions of Iranians who remain in the country and who consume content in Persian with an increasingly attentive eye toward the West.

It is revealing that, despite the regime's constant efforts to censor it, BBC Persian continues to broadcast in Iran. Over the years, Iranian authorities have resorted to all sorts of methods to silence it—blocking frequencies, web filtering, intimidation—but the network has managed to maintain its presence: its broadcasts remain accessible via satellite, and its website continues to operate within Iran. Even its journalists, from the United Kingdom, have been subjected to direct threats, which illustrates the reach and discomfort its reporting generates.⁶

Yes, if, as Nye argues, soft power consists of getting others to desire the same objectives as oneself, the inevitable question arises: what, then, are the United Kingdom's objectives in maintaining a platform like BBC Persia?

BBC Persia was founded in 1940, in the midst of World War II, with a clearly defined objective: to counter Axis influence in Iran using the Persian language. At that time, Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, showed an ambiguous attitude towards the Axis, something the United Kingdom considered potentially destabilizing. In this context, London needed to neutralize this drift without immediately opting for direct military occupation.⁷ The British government used Persian-language radio as a tool of psychological warfare, designed from the outset as an instrument of discursive modeling aimed at weakening pro-German sympathies and reinforcing the Allied narrative. There was nothing spontaneous about this communication deployment. BBC Persian broadcasts offered the Allied version of the conflict and helped prepare the ground for the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in 1941, which led to Reza Shah's abdication in favor of his son. It was a strategic media operation that accompanied, and even preceded, military intervention: an early example of what Nye would later conceptualize as soft power.

Currently, BBC Persia is seen as a relevant source of information for broad sectors of the diaspora and certain dissidents within the country. However, among them, there persists a suspicion—not entirely unfounded—that it is ultimately a Western tool.⁸ During the 1970s, the network maintained an editorial line characterized by its critical stance towards Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, aligning with the approach of the Jimmy Carter administration.⁹ So, in its radio version, BBC Persia denounced systematic human rights violations. The monarch himself let the British ambassador in Tehran, Anthony Parsons, know that the BBC was “his number one enemy.”.¹⁰

One of the most revealing episodes was the decision to broadcast the speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini, who was then exiled in Paris. This action caused some bewilderment and disbelief at the British Embassy. Parsons tried to convey this concern to the British government, as in his opinion, such broadcasting was harming the stability of its greatest ally in the region. The official response from the government, however, was that BBC Persia transmitted the values of the United Kingdom, one of its fundamental values being freedom of expression. Furthermore, they clarified that the BBC was a government-funded channel, yes, but completely editorially independent.

Paradoxically, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, whose initial phases were met with some media tolerance from the BBC, gave rise to a deeply anti-Western theocratic regime. This makes it difficult to believe that the Islamic Revolution benefited the West in any way. Shortly after the Shah's fall, Iran became considered one of the main strategic antagonists of the United States and its allies, even going so far as to kidnap American diplomats. Shortly after Khomeini took power in 1979, Western powers—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—provided aid to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).¹². Currently, the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the main enemies of the West.

BBC Persia has historically been the voice of certain Enlightenment values – freedom of the press, political criticism, secularism – that do not always align with the strategic interests of the British state. The soft power it projects appears to be less the result of a calculated strategy than the collateral product of a liberal media ecosystem.

What is difficult to discern is not whether BBC Persia acts as a tool of British influence—something that is evident if one analyzes its impact and content—but whether it acts according to explicit government directives or if, from its own liberal logic and editorial autonomy, it produces effects similar to those of a sophisticated propaganda operation, albeit with occasional errors. Perhaps, as Nye suggests, therein lies the power of soft power: in an un-planned seduction, in which exiled Iranian journalists communicate without filters or censorship, but whose voices do not contradict British interests, but rather legitimize them.

There are many theories about the true intentions that guide each global actor. Some of them are plausible, others are based on assumptions that are difficult to verify. However, what is most disconcerting is that, even in the absence of clear and coherent design and planning, the Western model continues to generate political effects of great depth..

Liberal democracy—a system of designed, limited, yet substantial freedoms—produces consequences that do not always align with the strategic interests of states. Regular changes of government, fragile mandates, and the autonomy of academic and media elites generate a foreign policy that can occasionally be erratic, not always pragmatic, sometimes idealistic, or even destructive, and which is inherent to this model.

And yet, something in that seemingly chaotic setup manages to exert a powerful attraction. However, this attraction is not necessarily manifested in the formal adoption of institutions or ideological frameworks, but is transmitted through cultural references, lifestyles, and future ideals. It convinces the urbanites of Tehran, who wear Western-style clothing and ride Harley-Davidson motorcycles. It also convinces young people with tight jeans and Adidas brand sneakers, and those who organize underground parties and share their lives on social media. And this is precisely what the United Kingdom is looking for. The soft power The West does not impose; it filters in. It does not require aggressive foreign policy, but rather a persistent symbolic presence that shapes individual aspirations and, in the medium term, influences the national political fabric.

The West, with its flaws and contradictions, is alluring.

A classic, almost intuitive answer to the reason for being of states has been this: to allow a certain way of life to express itself in the world. This way of life in the state encompasses its rituals, its mythical vision, its language, its customs and traditions. Differences in these have historically been causes of conflict, and not necessarily conflicts governed by the Geneva Convention, but also everyday conflicts between neighbors, cities, or communities of all kinds.

The concept of soft power has introduced an alternative to the logic of confrontation. Its greatest achievement has not been solely offering a non-coercive means of influence, but rather posing the possibility of reducing those differences through cultural attraction. What if we all shared the same cultural references? What if we all learned to see in series like Friends an aspirational model of urban life? What if consuming a macchiato at international chains like Starbucks, listening to pop music, or watching Marvel movies constituted a common language? If the ideal man for everyone on the planet is similar, it's logical that he would demand the same things anywhere in the world.

In this framework, culture is no longer merely an expression of identity; it is a vehicle for convergence. As the ideal of the subject becomes global, political demands tend to homogenize. The citizen of Tehran, as a consumer of the same symbolic goods as those in Madrid, Tel Aviv, or Brussels, soon demands similar forms of representation, freedom, and access. The desired lifestyle model begins to be shared, even when the political regimes are not yet.

In that sense, a large part of the Iranian population already responds to the logic of this cultural convergence. Despite persistent stereotypes in the West, many of their daily practices, aspirations, and emotional codes already operate within the global imagination. It is not far-fetched to think that, over time, the dissonance between rulers and ruled will become unsustainable, and that political transformation will respond not so much to external pressures as to an internal demand for coherence with the values that are already present in everyday life.

Cultural homogenization doesn't eliminate conflict, but it does displace it. Soft power doesn't impose an ideology, but rather a horizon of desire and attraction. And it's from there that its effectiveness operates.